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The puzzle of the changing past
LUCA BARLASSINA AND FABIO DEL PRETE
The past has changed. We shall show this by putting together a platitude
about truth and the past with a true story you already know.
1. Here is the platitude: we say true (false) things about the past, and the
truth (falsity) of what we say depends on how the past is. For example, if you
now say that Obama was born in 1961, you say something about the past,
and what you say is true because the past is such that Obama was born in
1961.
To make the point more precise, let’s introduce the following terminology:
A. People utter sentences at contexts, which are minimally constituted by
the world and the time at which the sentence is uttered. Thus, if you
uttered sentence (1) ‘Obama was born in 1961’ on the 1st of January
2000 at the actual world @, the context of your utterance is <@, 1st
January 2000>.
B. Sentences express propositions at contexts. For example, sentence (1) at
context <@, 1st January 2000> expresses the proposition that Obama
was born in 1961.1
C. A sentence S is temporally specific if and only if, for any context c, the
proposition expressed by S at c ascribes a property to a specific time.2
Sentence (1) is temporally specific given that, for any context c, the
proposition it expresses at c ascribes to the year 1961 the property of
being a time in which Obama was born.3
D. A sentence is about a past time in a context c if and only if the prop-
osition it expresses at c ascribes a property to a specific time that pre-
cedes the time of c. Accordingly, sentence (1) is about a past time in
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1 There are many theories of propositions on the market. For our purpose, it is unnecessary
to choose one. Pick the one you like the most.
2 The definition of temporally specific sentence is based on the referential analysis of tense
originally proposed by Partee (1973) as an alternative to Prior’s (1967) operator-based
account. According to the referential analysis, the logical form of (1) is roughly as follows:
(i) [t now & t¼1961 & Obama-be-born(t)]
Despite the strenuous resistance of some supporters of the operator-based account
(Recanati 2007; Brogaard 2012), Partee’s proposal has become the default position on
the semantics of tense (Abusch 1997; Heim 1994; King 2007; Kratzer 1998; von Stechow
1995).
3 Notice that the definition does not require that the time and the property be the same at all
contexts. Thus, the sentence ‘Yesterday I was in Rome’ counts as temporally specific on
our definition.
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<@, 1st January 2000>, since the year 1961 precedes the time of this
context.
With A–D at hand, we can express our initial platitude as the following
semantic principle:
TAP: Truth about past times
Let S, c, p, Q, t be such that: S is a temporally specific sentence that is
about a past time in context c, p is the proposition expressed by S at c,
and Q is the property that p ascribes to the specific time t. Then, S is true
in c if and only if t has property Q relative to the past of c.4
For example, sentence (1) is true in <@, 1st January 2000> because, relative
to the past of <@, 1st January 2000>, the year 1961 has the property of
being a time in which Obama was born.
2. And here is the true story. It is the 23rd of July 2000. Being the rider
with the lowest overall time at the end of the last stage, Lance Armstrong is
declared the winner of the Tour de France by Union du Cyclisme
Internationale (UCI). On <@, 25th December 2002> (hereafter, Context
A), Frank utters (2):
(2) Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000.
There is a clear intuition that Frank said something true. Time goes by.
Having discovered that Armstrong made use of banned substances, on 22
October 2012 UCI withdraws all of Armstrong’s wins at Tour de France. As
Frank is not aware of this fact, he utters (2) again at <@, 25th December
2012> (hereafter, Context B). This time, it seems that Frank said something
false.
What’s the moral of this story? (2) is a temporally specific sentence that is
about a past time in both Context A and Context B. Moreover, since (2) does
not contain any context-sensitive element – there are no demonstratives, in-
dexicals, gradable adjectives, etc. in it – it expresses the same proposition at
both Context A and Context B, namely, (3):5
(3) that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000.
4 It is trivial to see that TAP directly results from a combination of the classical Kaplanian
notion of Truth-in-Context (Kaplan 1989) with the referential analysis of tense.
5 One might point out that, on the referential analysis of tense we are adopting, the tense is
a context-sensitive element, that is, a variable which picks out a contextually relevant time.
Fair enough. Still, the past tense in (2) is an instance of a bound variable – the time adverb
‘in 2000’ binds it to the year 2000. Hence, (2) expresses proposition (3) at both Context A
and Context B.
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Since (2) is true in Context A, it follows from TAP that, relative to the past of
Context A, the year 2000 has the property of being a time in which
Armstrong won the Tour de France. And since (2) is false in Context B, it
follows from TAP that, relative to the past of Context B, the year 2000 does
not have the property of being a time in which Armstrong won the Tour de
France. However, Context A and Context B are located in the same world,
that is, the actual world. This means that, in moving from Context A to
Context B, the past (of the actual world) has changed: the year 2000 had a
certain property on Christmas 2002, but did not have that property on
Christmas 2012 any longer.
If one thinks that the conclusion that the past has changed is too crazy to be
true, one will have to impugn one or more of our premises. Which ones? We
take it that one cannot but accept that Context A and Context B are located in
the same world, and also that sentence (2) is a temporally specific sentence that
is about a past time in both contexts.Moreover,TAP is a quite uncontroversial
way to capture a pre-theoretical intuition about what it takes for a sentence
about a past time to be true.6 Therefore, if one intends to avoid the conclusion
that the past has changed, one will probably have to resist one or the other of
the following premises: first, the intuition that (2) is true in Context A and false
in Context B; second, the claim that (2) expresses the same proposition at both
Context A and Context B. Let’s consider these two objections in turn.
3. The objection that (2) has not changed its truth value from Context A to
Context B comes in two variants. The first goes like this: Armstrong managed
to have the lowest overall time at the Tour de France in 2000 only by doping
himself, thus by cheating; but since one cannot be the winner if one cheated,
(2) was already false in Context A.
This objection rests on a confusion, by which the property being the
winner is conflated with the property being the person who deserves
6 If one favours an operator-based account of tense over a referential analysis, one might
argue that TAP is in fact controversial, since it is based on the latter analysis. This ob-
jection won’t do, since an even more serious puzzle emerges if one adopts an operator-
based account of tense. On the latter, the logical form of (2) is (ii):
(ii) P(Armstrong wins the Tour de France & it is 2000)
Formula (ii) is true in a context c if and only if ‘Armstrong wins the Tour de France & it is
2000’ is true relative to cw and a time t< ct (where cw and ct are, respectively, the world
and the time of c). This entails that (ii) is true in c if and only if ‘Armstrong wins the Tour
de France’ is true relative to cw and a time t< ct such that t¼ 2000. Thus, since (ii) is true
in Context A, ‘Armstrong wins the Tour de France’ is true relative to @ and a time
t< 25th December 2002 such that t¼2000; and since (ii) is false in Context B, it is not
the case that ‘Armstrong wins the Tour de France’ is true relative to @ and a time t< 25th
December 2012 such that t¼2000. But this means that there is a time in the past of @,
namely the year 2000, in which Armstrong both wins and doesn’t win the Tour de France.
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to win. True enough, one cannot enjoy the latter property if one cheated;
however, one can enjoy the former even if one cheated, since the possession
of the property being the winner is determined solely by a declaration of a
competent authority, and a competent authority may, for one reason or an-
other, declare a cheater the winner. Consider, for example, the match be-
tween Argentina and England at the FIFA World Cup in 1986. Argentina
won the match 2–1. However, the crucial score was achieved through a
blatant violation of a rule, as Argentinian player Maradona pushed the
ball into the net with his hand. The referee did not see the infraction and
validated the score. Thus, even though Argentina cheated, and hence did not
deserve to win the match, it was nonetheless the winner, since the competent
authority so declared.
With this in mind, ask yourself again: was (2) true when uttered in Context
A? Needless to say, Armstrong did not deserve to win the Tour de France in
2000. Therefore, (2) would be false in Context A if it ascribed the property
being a person who deserves to win the Tour de France in 2000 to
Armstrong. However, (2) does not ascribe this property to Armstrong, but
rather ascribes the property being the winner of the Tour de France in 2000
to him. Since on 23 July 2000 a competent authority had declared Armstrong
the winner, and this declaration was still valid on Christmas 2002, it follows
that (2) is true in Context A.
The second variant of the objection has it that (2) is still true after the
revocation of Armstrong’s titles – hence, still true in Context B. One can try
to support this intuition by exploiting the platitude that sincere speakers only
assert what they take to be true sentences, and then pointing to cases in which
sincere and informed speakers seem to assert (2), or sentences entailing (2),
after the revocation of Armstrong’s titles. For example, one might consider
discourses like the following ones:
(4) Armstrong won the Tour de France seven times from 1999 to 2005.
He was later stripped of those titles for doping.
(USA Today, 28 June 2013)7
(5) The American won seven times straight, before being disqualified for
systematic doping.
(The Australian, 13 July 2013)8
(4) seems to entail (2) because discourses in which two sentences S1, S2 are
concatenated are usually interpreted as entailing the logical conjunction [S1
& S2] (Asher and Lascarides 2003), hence as entailing S1. Therefore, given
7 http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/06/28/lance-armstrong-impossible-win-
tour-de-france-doping/2471413/
8 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/sport/opinion/chris-froome-looking-just-too-good-in-
yellow-jersey-at-tour-de-france/story-e6frg7t6-1226678708461#mm-premium
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that the conjunct S1 in (4), namely, ‘Armstrong won the Tour de France seven
times from 1999 to 2005’, entails (2), one might conclude that (4) entails (2).
On the other hand, complex sentences of the form [S1 before S2] are usually
understood as entailing their component sentence S1 (Beaver and
Condoravdi, 2003). Thus, since S1 in (5), i.e., ‘The American won seven
times straight’, contextually entails (2), it might appear safe to conclude
that (5) contextually entails (2). These conclusions, however, are flawed. If
(4) really entailed its S1-component, the addition of sentence (6) to (4) would
result in a contradiction, since (6) and the S1-component of (4) are logically
incompatible:
(6) Armstrong never won any Tour de France in the end.
But the following discourse is perfectly consistent:
(7) Armstrong won the Tour de France seven times from 1999 to 2005.
He was later stripped of those titles for doping. So, Armstrong never
won any Tour de France in the end.
Therefore, (4) does not entail its S1-component. Hence, given that (4) could
entail (2) only in virtue of entailing its S1-component, it follows that (4) does
not entail (2) either. The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to (5).
Accordingly, the alleged evidence in support of the intuition that (2) is true in
Context B does not stand up scrutiny.
It turns out that there are in fact plenty of assertions made by sincere and
informed speakers that entail that (2) is false if uttered after the titles’ with-
drawal. Here are just a few of them:
(8) Who won the Tour de France 1999-2005? No one.
(Law, Economics & Cycling, 22 October 2012)9
(9) Lance Armstrong has no longer won any Tour de France titles.10
(10) Lance Armstrong is no longer the winner of the Tour de France
from 1999 to 2005.
(Christian Prudhomme, Director of the Tour de France, from
CBSNews, 22 October2012)11
Thus, the strategy of considering assertions made by informed and
sincere speakers, rather than supporting the intuition that (2) is true in
9 http://cyclingprof.blogspot.fr/2012/10/congratulations-to-no-one.html
10 http://twitter.com/TheCodyG/statuses/238835618472423424
11 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-400_162-57537025/lance-armstrong-stripped-of-tour-de-
france-medals/
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Context B, provides evidence in favour of the intuition that (2) is false in that
context.
4. A second way in which one might try to block the conclusion that the
past has changed is arguing that the proposition that is false in Context B is
not the same as the proposition that is true in Context A. There are two
plausible ways to articulate this objection:
Contextualism
The verb phrase ‘win the Tour de France in 2000’ is a context-sensitive
monadic predicate whose content at a context depends on which dec-
laration is relevant in that context.12
Relationalism
The verb phrase ‘win the Tour de France in 2000’ is an implicitly rela-
tional predicate (Condoravdi and Gawron 1996) which, at a certain
context, relates a person and a declaration that is relevant in that
context.13
On these accounts, (2) is predicted to express proposition (11) at Context A
and proposition (12) at Context B:14
(11) that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according to
UCI declaration of the 23rd of July 2000 (hereafter ‘declaration a’);
(12) that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according
to UCI declaration of the 22nd of October 2012 (hereafter ‘declar-
ation b’).
12 More precisely, the content of ‘win the Tour de France in 2000’ at a context c would be a
function from worlds w to sets of individuals i such that i wins the Tour de France in 2000
in w according to the declaration that is relevant in context c.
13 Relationalism naturally follows from the view that the property being the winner of the
Tour de France in 2000 is a relational property holding (at a context c) between a person
and a declaration (which is valid in c) by a competent authority.
14 Strictly speaking, the two accounts ascribe different logical forms to sentence (2):
(iii) Contextualism:
[TP PAST [T’ [DP Lance Armstrong][VP win the Tour de France in 2000]]]
(iv) Relationalism:
[TP PAST [T’ [DP Lance Armstrong][VP win the Tour de France in 2000 according to d]]]
This difference, however, has no bearing on the point we are making here, since (iii) and
(iv) specify the same proposition in any given context – relative to a context c, they specify
the proposition that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according to the
declaration by UCI that is relevant in c.
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Contextualism and Relationalism, however, face a major problem.
Suppose that, having come to know that Armstrong’s titles have been
revoked by declaration b, Ms. Blue utters sentence (13) at Context B:
(13) It is no longer the case that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de
France in 2000.
There is a clear intuition that (13) is true in Context B, but one cannot
account for this if one assumes that the verb phrase ‘win the Tour de
France in 2000’ is a context-sensitive monadic predicate or an implicitly
relational predicate. On both accounts, since the declaration that is relevant
in Context B is declaration b, (13) is predicted to express proposition (14) at
that context:
(14) that it is no longer the case that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de
France in 2000 according to declaration .
According to Contextualism, declaration b enters proposition (14) in virtue
of being a part of the content (at Context B) of ‘win the Tour de France in
2000’. According to Relationalism, declaration b enters proposition (14) in
virtue of being an argument of the implicitly relational predicate ‘win the
Tour de France in 2000’. Either way, the propositional constituent according
to declaration  obligatorily takes narrow scope with respect to the propos-
itional constituent it is no longer the case that. Thus, (14) has to be kept
distinct from (14’):
(14’) that according to declaration , it is no longer the case that Lance
Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000.
Rather, (14) must be read as presupposing that it was true in the past that
Armstrong won-the-Tour-de-France-in-2000-according-to-declaration-b. But
this presupposition is false in Context B: since declaration b established the
revocation of Armstrong’s titles, it has never been the case that, relative to the
past of Context B, Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000 according to
. Therefore, sentence (13) cannot be true in Context B in virtue of expressing
proposition (14) at that context, thus ‘win the Tour de France in 2000’ is
neither a context-sensitive monadic predicate, nor an implicitly relational
predicate. Since sentence (2) does not contain any other element which
may be plausibly regarded as context-sensitive, it follows that (2) expresses
the same proposition at both Context A and Context B.
5. Conclusion
Without any doubt, there is something puzzling in the conclusion
that the past has changed. This conclusion, however, has been shown to
follow from a platitude and a true story. One should then stop asking
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whether the past can change and start to inquire on how to make sense of
this. We leave this task to a future paper – unless the future changes.15
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